

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 NSC-05 DODE-00 EB-07 OMB-01 IO-10 H-02 ERDA-05

OES-03 NEA-10 SAM-01 STR-04 COM-02 CIEP-01 /109 W

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R 131715Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4573

INFO AMEMBASSY BLEGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BONN

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E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: PFOR NATO GW YO

SUBJECT: VISIT OT FRG BY YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC

FOLLOWING IS REPORT, CIRCULATED BY FRG DEL IN NATO POLADS, ON
NOVEMBER 3-5 VISIT TO FRG BY YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ON THE INVITATION OF MR GENSCHER, YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER
MINIC CAME TO BONN FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT FROM 3 TO 5
NOVEMBER 1975. HE WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT SCHEEL,
CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AS WELL AS MR FRIDERICH, MINISTER OF
ECONOMICS, AND MR BAHR, MINISTER FOR DEVELOPMENT AID.

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HE ALSO HAD TALKS WITH THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, MR BRANDT, AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY, MR KOHL.

2. THE PURPOSE F THE VISIT WAS TO CONTINUE THE GERMAN-YUGOSLAV EXCHANGE OF VIES ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS.

3. ON CSCE AND DETENTE, BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT, AFTER THE FINAL ACT HAS BEEN SIGNED IN HELSINKI, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE DECISION S WAS NOW OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE. MR GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD PURSUE EITH DETERMINATION ITS POLICY OF DETENTE ON THE BASIS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLINACE AND WITH N THE FRMAEWORK OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

4. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE WP TO THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES BY NATO AND ABOUT THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE GDR. THIS TREATY RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE HELSINKI ARRANGEMENTS WERE TO BE INAPPLICABLE BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE SOCISLIST GROUP OF STATES. THE YUGOSLAV SIDE, FOR ITS PART, CONFIRMED ITS POSITIN THAT THE HELSINKI DECISIONS HAD TO APPLY BETWEEN ALL STATES AND SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED AS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BLOCKS.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC WENT ON TO SAY THAT, AS THE HOST TO THE 1977 MEETING IN BLEGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA HAD THE INTENTION TO ASSUE A VERY ACTIVE ROLE IN REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI DECISIONS. YUGOSLAVIA NOTED THAT THERE WAS A RESTRICTIVE TENDENCY IN THE EAST AS FAR AS THE INTERPRETATIMON OF THE HELSINKI DECISIONS WAS CONCERNED. THE WEST, ON THE OTHER HAND,WAS INCLINED TO OVEREMPHASIZE BASKET III. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE DECISIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS A WHOLE. HE HOPED THAT THE EAST WOULD DEVELOP A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. THE HELSINKI DECISIONS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR GRADUALLY OVERCOMING THE BLOCK TO BLOCK APPROACH. THIS REQUIRED PATIENCE.

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6. MR MINIC WELCOMED OUR AGREEMENT WITH POLAND AS ONE OF THE FIRST PRACTICAL RESULTS OF HELSINKI. YUGOSLAVIA, FOR ITS PART, HAD JUST SOVED A DANGEROUS PROBLEM WITH ITALY, NAMELY THE QUESTIN OF TRIESTE.

7. MR GENSCHER UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL APP- LICATIN OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN FOR DETENTE. MR MINIC REPLIED THAT YUGOSLAVIA SUPPORTED THE SAFEGUARDING OF BERLINS PRESENT STATUS. HE STRONGLY UNDERLINED THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AND WAS CONTINUED TO BE MADE BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN REGARD TO INTERNATINAL DETENTE.

8. AS FAR AS THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE CONCERNED, YUGOSLAVIA HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THA THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTIRES WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE DECISIONS. AFTER SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES OD OPINION AT THE BEGINNING, THE VIEW WAS GAINNG GROUND AMONG THEM THAT A JOINT DOCUMENT MIGHT BE AGREED IF IT PROVIDED FOR THE UNQUALIFIED CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE. YUGOSLAVIA THEREFOER NOW EXPECTED THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD SUCCEED. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT YET CERTAIN WHETHER IT WOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS.

9. ON DISARMAMENT, MR MINIC SHOWED HIMSELF ALARMED AT THE PURSUIT OF THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE GREAT POSERS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT TALKS. YUGOSLAVIA CONSIDERED THAT PROGRESS IN VIENNA WAS HIGHLY IMPORTANT. MR GENSCHER REPLIED THAT SINCE THE DEFENCE EFFORTS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTIRES WERE DECREISING RATHER THAN INCREASING, WE VIEWED WITH CONCERN THE MILITARY STRENGTHENING OF THE WP COUNTRIES IN THE CONVENTINAL AS WILL AS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD. WE WERE ALSO GREATLYINTERESTED IN PROGRESS AT THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

10. WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST, MR MINIC SAID THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD SUPPORTED THE ISRAELI EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT ON CONDITION THAT FURTHER STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE DIRECTIN OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE INCREASE IN ARMAMENTS IN THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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MIDDLE EAST PROCEDDED FASTE THAN PEACE EFFORTS, AND CALLED ATTENTION TO THE NEW TROUBLE SPOT IN LEBANON.

11. ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, MR MINIC EMPHASIZED YUGOSLAVIAS STRONG INTEREST IN A CLOSE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE 7TH UN SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME THAT A SITUATIN HAD ARISEN WHERE THE POSSIBILITIS FOR WORLD WIDE COOPERATION WERE GREATER THAN THE DANGER OF CONFRONTATION.

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SAJ-01 DODE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 OMB-01 IO-10 H-02 ERDA-05

OES-03 NEA-10 SAM-01 STR-04 COM-02 CIEP-01 /109 W

----- 126919

R 131715Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4574

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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12. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WAS ALSO IN THE FOREGROUND OF THE TALK WITH MR BAHR. IN THE COURSE OF THIS TALK, MR MINIC UNDERLINED THAT THE NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION INsofar AS THEY NO LONGER PROCEEDED FROM UNILATERAL DEMANDS- WHICH NECESSARILY LED TO CONFRONTATION- BUT ENDEAVOURED TO REGARD THE WORLD ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. HE HOPED THAT THE COLOMBO CONFERENCE WOULD BRING FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. MR BAHR EMPHASIZED FOR HIS PART THAT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY MAJORITY DECISIONS BUT ONLY BY A CONSENSUS.

13. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND YUGOSLAVIA WERE DESCRIBED BY BOTH SIDES AS GOOD AND
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PROBLEM FREE. MR MINIC UNDERLINED THE YUGOSLAV DESIRE FOR A REDUCTION OF THE LARGE YUGOSLAVE DEFICIT IN TRADE WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND FOR POLITICAL REASONS. YUGOSLAVIA WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF ITS FOREIGN TRADE. WHILE EXPORTS TO WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD SERIOUSLY DECLINED, THOSE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD GROWN. SHOULD THIS TREND CONTINUE, YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT BECOME DEPENDENT ON ITS FOREIGN TRADE IN MANNER WHICH IT PREFERRED TO AVOID. IN ORDER TO REVERSE THE UNSATISFACTORY DEVELOPMENT, EFFORTS WERE REQUIRED ON THE GERMAN SIDE AS WELL AS ON THE PART OF EC. MR GENSCHER REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT DESIRE ANY LIMITATION OF YUGOSLAVIAS

INDEPENDENT POSITION AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC FACTORS. HE
EXPRESSED THE HOPED THAT THE SITUATIN MIGHT IMPOVE FOLLOWING
A CYCLICAL UPSWING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

END TEXT. STREATOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 NOV 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: izenbei0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO06179
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 NA
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751189/abbrzndk.tel
Line Count: 224
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: izenbei0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <25 SEP 2003 by izenbei0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VISIT OT FRG BY YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC
TAGS: PFOR NATO GW YO
To: STATE INFO BLEGRADE
BERLIN
BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
MOSCOW
PRAGUE

SOFIA
WARSAW
BONN

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006